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the conflict, as opposed to focusing 
on how America fought� Moyn then 
traces a shift toward the end of the war, 
particularly Telford Taylor’s trenchant 
criticism of American warfighting 
practices, which Taylor came to view 
as unlawful� By contrast, Moyn argues 
that criticism of our modern conflicts is 
directed at the conduct of hostilities—
torture, rules of engagement, and war 
crimes� He ascribes this to the end of 
conscription and the relative inoculation 
of much of the American public from 
the effects of our wars abroad, but also 
to a larger shift in the broad discourse 
about the law of war in the modern era, 
in which the means and methods of 
warfare are much more tightly regulated� 
The final essay builds to some extent on 
Moyn’s work, though Larry May’s “War 
Crimes Trials during and after War” is 
less cogent and ultimately less valu-
able� May sets out to examine whether 
war crimes trials are best prosecuted 
while hostilities are still under way or 
after hostilities are concluded� Contro-
versially, May argues that war crimes 
trials during hostilities ought to address 
jus ad bellum matters: once a tribunal 
finds that unlawful “aggressive war” is 
being waged, soldiers of that side are 
on notice that they may be participants 
in the war crime of aggression� This 
strikes the reviewer as highly implau-
sible, and for that reason this essay 
is perhaps the weakest of the five�
Ultimately, Law and War is a collec-
tion of essays that are largely concep-
tual and highly normative in their 
arguments� As such it is undoubtedly 
a thought-provoking and challenging 
book, but also one that is not likely to 
be of immediate use to military lawyers 
per se� On the other hand, for non-
lawyers who ponder the role of law in 
war, in policy making, and in shap-
ing and reflecting societal norms, the 
book offers many valuable insights�
JOHN MERRIAM
Daddis, Gregory� Westmoreland’s War: Reassess-
ing American Strategy in Vietnam� Oxford, U�K�: 
Oxford Univ� Press, 2015� 320pp� $36�95
General William Westmoreland, the 
American commander of Military As-
sistance Command Vietnam (MACV) 
from 1964 through 1968, remains one of 
the most contentious personalities of the 
Vietnam War, still the subject of intense 
debate among veterans and historians 
of the war� Prevalent still is the view 
that “Westy” could not see the forest for 
the trees, or vice versa, and disastrously 
lacked strategic vision and operational 
creativity owing to his parochial focus 
on employing Cold War “big unit” 
doctrine and attrition to combat an 
insurgent war of unification� The most 
extreme of such assessments of West-
moreland comes from Lewis Sorley, who 
in multiple works, notably Westmore-
land: The General Who Lost Vietnam 
(Houghton Mifflin, 2011), all but charges 
Westmoreland with gross negligence� 
Gregory Daddis, formerly of the Military 
History Department at West Point and 
now associate professor of history at 
Chapman University, offers what he 
believes is a more balanced view of this 
controversial general� In Westmore-
land’s War, Daddis argues that instead 
of lacking understanding of the con-
flict in Vietnam and warmly wrapping 
himself in the comfort of familiar “big 
unit” doctrine, Westmoreland em-
braced counterinsurgency approaches 
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and pacification, strongly supported 
building up the Army of the Republic 
of Vietnam (ARVN), and recognized 
the importance of establishing the 
political legitimacy of the government 
of the Republic of Vietnam among the 
South Vietnamese people� Far from 
the bumbling, career-climbing marti-
net characterized by Sorley, Daddis’s 
Westmoreland at least asserted an intel-
lectual understanding of the challenges 
of revolutionary warfare� Daddis argues 
that West moreland recognized the need 
for pacification and other counterinsur-
gency measures, but failed to articulate 
his strategy publicly or to his command-
ers in the field, ending up conducting 
what was in essence an unwinnable war�
Daddis offers a challenging corrective on 
Westmoreland, but some will find that 
his ideas fall a bit short� What West-
moreland said and wrote, which Daddis 
ably reveals through his extensive and 
valuable archival research, does not con-
nect to what happened on the battlefield� 
Westmoreland could not militarily rec-
tify the political problems of South Viet-
nam, and, as both the military and polit-
ical situations continued to deteriorate, 
Westmoreland in turn relied more on 
big-unit search and destroy operations 
and the massive firepower the American 
military had at its disposal� The military 
situation, arguably, dictated that West-
moreland use his limited resources—yes, 
limited resources—to stem the tide 
on the military side at the expense of 
manpower and resources for pacification 
and other nonkinetic programs� Attri-
tion, whether Westmoreland intended 
it or not (Daddis argues not), was the 
public face of his strategic and opera-
tional approach throughout his tenure 
as commander of MACV� If that was 
indeed the case, then Westmoreland’s 
failure is in part one of miscommunicat-
ing what it was he believed he was doing 
in South Vietnam, if not disconnecting 
that belief through intent or ignorance 
from the military reality his forces 
faced, especially from 1966 forward�
Vietnam was not Westmoreland’s war� 
Yes, Westmoreland has been and prob-
ably will continue to be the face of that 
conflict� He is, after all, an easy if not 
agreeable target on which to place a 
great deal of blame for the American 
debacle� However, as Daddis correctly 
points out, the Johnson administration, 
not Westmoreland, placed limitations on 
what Westmoreland could do in Viet-
nam� Political leaders in Washington, 
like the military leader Westmore land, 
eagerly accepted the primacy of Ameri-
can firepower as a military solution to 
both military and political problems in 
South Vietnam� Still, one must accept 
that the officials of the Johnson admin-
istration grounded those limitations in 
deep political earth� At the time, they 
believed they had good reasons for ap-
proaching the conflict the way they did� 
Ultimately, as Daddis suggests, it did not 
matter what those in Washington, Sai-
gon, or MACV did� The war in Vietnam 
was a bad war that American leadership 
believed had to be fought nonetheless, 
resulting in defeat and tragedy that still 
haunts the United States fifty years later�
Westmoreland’s War is an important 
book� Scholars of the conflict should 
read it� Daddis offers thought-provoking 
arguments that counter the Sorley 
school on the Westmoreland years of 
American involvement in Vietnam� 
Whether one agrees with Daddis (or 
Sorley for that matter), diligent scholars 
must consider Daddis’s point of view 
and his interpretation of the archival 
evidence� Daddis has made a valuable 
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contribution to the discussion, just 
as he did with his similarly provoca-
tive No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. 
Army Effectiveness and Progress in the 
Vietnam War (Oxford, 2011). As for 
Westmoreland, the debate continues.
WILLIAM THOMAS ALLISON
Hill, Christopher. Outpost: Life on the Frontlines 
of American Diplomacy. New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2014. 448pp. $30
An American diplomat for over three 
decades, Christopher Hill’s service 
took him all over the globe and into 
some of the most challenging cir-
cumstances faced by a member of 
the Foreign Service. This account of 
his unique postings during that dy-
namic time frame is a vivid reminder 
of how much the world has changed. 
In his memoir, Outpost: Life on the 
Frontlines of American Diplomacy, Hill, 
now a dean at the Josef Korbel School of 
International Studies at the University 
of Denver, traces his rise in the Depart-
ment of State in a style that is engaging 
and lively. His writing is honest and 
reflective as he recounts his interactions 
with some of the most distinguished 
and most notorious individuals to grace 
the world stage. Over the course of his 
fast-paced narrative, he doesn’t pull any 
punches in his assessments of people or 
policy decisions and, most importantly, 
he shares valuable and candid insights 
(both successes and failures) and lessons 
learned over his distinguished career. 
Prior to his start in the State Depart-
ment, Hill spent two years in the Peace 
Corps. He recalls trying to influence a 
local credit union election in Cameroon 
and failing miserably. He learned the 
folly of trying to change the behavior 
of an entire community. He writes, 
“Years later, in the Middle East, in the 
Balkans, in Asia, I would see time and 
time again systemized efforts on the part 
of the United States to pick winners in 
situations we understood little about. 
Like my efforts at the Tole Tea Estate’s 
credit union, they never worked.”
Another key theme that emerges is the 
importance of mentoring and how it 
enabled Hill to reach his full potential 
in the State Department. His early as-
signments under Lawrence Eagleburger 
(later Secretary of State under George H. 
W. Bush) in Yugoslavia and Richard Hol-
brooke (lead negotiator at the Dayton 
Peace Accords and later ambassador 
to the UN) at the European Bureau 
exposed him to two of the best practitio-
ners of statecraft in the U.S. government. 
After recounting the great success at 
Dayton, Hill transitions his narrative 
to the latter part of his career, in which 
his record as a Foreign Service officer 
is a little more mixed. He describes 
the numerous actors, both domes-
tic (politicians and members of the 
military) and international, that he 
encountered during some of his most 
demanding billets. These postings, 
as the Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, envoy 
to the North Korean nuclear talks for 
the Bush administration, and the U.S. 
ambassador to Iraq for the Obama 
administration, seem to have left Hill 
unfulfilled and somewhat frustrated.
He takes both administrations to task 
for what he believes was an unhealthy 
blend of partisan politics and lack of a 
long-term policy vision. Of particular 
note is Hill’s withering critique of Vice 
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